Rússar og Bandaríkjamenn
Ef að stríð myndi brjótast út á milli rússa og bandaríkjamanna , án afskipta annara þjóða. Hvor væri sigurstranglegri með tilliti til vopna og liðsafla?
Behind Russia's Bluster
By Vasko Kohlmayer
FrontPageMagazine.com | Wednesday, August 13, 2008
…But before we get wobbly in the knees, it would be wise to review the current state of Russia’s military to see how formidable our opponent actually is.
At 1.13 million strong, the Russian army may be formidable in size, but the quality of its personnel leaves much to be desired. Made up largely of teenage conscripts drafted for one-year compulsory service, most show little commitment to their mission. Given the dire conditions they are forced to endure this is no surprise. Poorly equipped and supplied, many fall ill from a lack of proper care and nutrition. That frostbite is a common scourge in wintertime shows just how inadequately clothed and outfitted the Russian army is. It is hard to believe that only this year the transition was made to regular socks. Up until now, Russian soldiers wore the kind of foot wraps in use since the Napoleonic wars.
The conduct of these beleaguered conscripts tends to be rowdy and unruly. Hazing of younger soldiers is a persistent problem with hundreds dying each year as a result. Those who think that Abu Ghraib represents the apotheosis of ruthless chicanery have not seen what goes on in the barracks of the Russian military.
The morale of officers is hardly better. With most earning less than $500 a month, many turn to theft and misappropriation as a way of supplementing their income. This is especially true of those in logistic and support units who have access to valuable material and equipment. The level of embezzlement can be gauged by counting foreign-made cars in front of the buildings where these officers work. That they are allowed to flaunt their unlawfully acquired affluence with such impunity testifies to the degree of corruption that permeates all levels of the military establishment.
One high-ranking retired officer put it this way:
I would say the quality of personnel is the biggest challenge that needs to be addressed. What we have now after the chaos of the 1990s is a long cry from Soviet days, when personnel were well paid, kept busy training and regularly zombie-fied by political drill officers on how they should be prepared to fight for the motherland.
In an effort to up the grade of its fighting men, the Russian Defense Ministry devised plans to turn the army into a semi-professional force with a core of salaried recruits. One of the goalposts of the program was to make the sergeant corps fully filled with volunteers by 2011. It is now clear that this objective will not be met as there is little interest, given that the basic wage offered is only 8,000 rubles (roughly $350) a month. Since in most cases housing is not included, it is difficult to survive on so little even in the cheaper regions of the country.
The old generals – almost all veterans of the Cold War era – blame the executive and legislative branches for not doing enough to support the motherland’s warriors. They are partially right: The Russian military is indeed underfunded. But the lack of money is not necessarily the result of the political leadership’s unwillingness to supply the needs, but rather a reflection of the realities of Russia’s new political system.
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The ultimate strength of the Russian military lies, of course, in its nuclear arsenal. But even on that front serious problems abound. Most of the country’s assets still date from the Soviet era with more and more becoming obsolete with each passing year. Expensive to maintain and replace, the government has decided to pare down the strategic arsenal to 1,700 warheads (the Soviets had 10,000 at the height of the Cold War). The new equipment, however, has been slow in arriving and there have been questions about how much of the country’s nuclear store is actually operational. At the same time, the government has been forced to decommission hundreds of aging Soviet-era intercontinental ballistic missiles, but due to budgetary constraints, the military can only afford some 10 new Topol ICBMs a year by way of replacement.
To add to the woes, the defense industry has been experiencing problems with the development of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. Intended as the naval component of the strategic air-land-sea nuclear trinity, several test firings of the much-hyped Bulava missile ended in failure. To Putin’s considerable embarrassment, one failed attempt occurred while he and his entourage were in attendance.
Troubled and underfunded, the Russian military finds itself in a state of upheaval and endemic disorder. In spite of Russia’s rhetorical bluster and the current flexing of its military muscle against a tiny neighbor, its actual military capabilities are a far cry from those of the Soviet Union whose superpower mantle it seeks to reclaim. This is all the more reason why America and its allies should not get intimidated by the bullying of Putin and company over the defense shield in Europe.